战争迷雾

记录片美国2003

主演:Robert McNamara

导演:埃罗尔·莫里斯

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 剧照

战争迷雾 剧照 NO.1战争迷雾 剧照 NO.2战争迷雾 剧照 NO.3战争迷雾 剧照 NO.4战争迷雾 剧照 NO.5战争迷雾 剧照 NO.6战争迷雾 剧照 NO.13战争迷雾 剧照 NO.14战争迷雾 剧照 NO.15战争迷雾 剧照 NO.16战争迷雾 剧照 NO.17战争迷雾 剧照 NO.18战争迷雾 剧照 NO.19战争迷雾 剧照 NO.20
更新时间:2023-08-31 17:05

详细剧情

  罗伯特•麦克纳马拉(Robert McNamara)是美国二战时期的战地指挥官、福特汽车公司第一位非福特家族的公司总裁,以及肯尼迪及约翰逊政府的国防部长。纪录片导演埃洛•莫里斯(Errol Morris)通过近24小时的采访,拍摄出纪录片《战争迷雾》,回顾了麦克纳马拉的一生,尤其他在二战中协助柯蒂斯•李梅将军对东京等67座日本城市进行毁灭性大规模火弹轰炸,帮助肯尼迪政府应对古巴导弹事件以及在肯尼迪总统遇刺前协商从越南撤兵的经过。莫里斯总结出来自麦克纳马拉的11条经验教训,对未来政府如何处理军事争端,如何防止毁灭性核战争的发生具有重要指导性意义。  本片获奥斯卡最佳纪录片奖和洛杉矶影评协会最佳纪录片奖。

 长篇影评

 1 ) 何为战争?

什么是战争?

没有一个人能够给出一个确定的答案。

通过The Fog of War, 我们或许能从Robert McNamara给予的十三个经验中,一瞥他对战争的理解。战争是复杂,多变,残酷的,就如同他亲口所说:

There‘s a wonder phrase: the for of war, it means that war is so complex it's beyond the ability of the human mind to comprehend all the variables.

事实正是如此。纵观人类历史,人类自相残杀过多少次?每次的理由又都是什么?我们或许通过研读历史,研究史料,能够分析出战争的成因。可是实际情况如何却是永远也无法分析出来的。因为,有时就连交战双方两国领导人,都并不知道自己究竟是为了什么而战。

越南战争就是如此。

McNamara在回忆越南战争的时候说到

We see incorretly or we see only half of the story at times. We see what we want to believe.

冷战时期,美国为了遏制亚洲红色势力,打算帮助南越攻打北越j。局势万分紧张一触即发。1964年8月4日,美国两艘驱逐舰j声称在东京湾遭受北越导弹袭击,最终使美国总统约翰逊下令攻击北越的几个目标,美国国会在1964年8月5日通过了《东京湾决议案》(Gulf Of Tonkin Resolution)授权约翰逊可采取一定必要措施击退对美国武装力量的任何武力进攻。

然而,后来美国发现,其实那一天他们的两艘驱逐舰并没有受到攻击。但是为时已晚,战争已经发生了。

McNamara回忆道:

We were wrong, but we had in our minds a mindset that led to that action. And it carried such heavy costs.

于是一场或许可以避免的战争就此爆发。因为人们,只看到了自己想看的。

还是越南战争。

在越战结束之后,McNamara曾经前往越南,与越南前首相探讨,如果当时两国之间没有爆发战争,结果会是如何?一探讨才发现,两国打得根本不是一场仗。

越南以为美国是为了取代法国在越南的殖民利益,把越南当成自己的殖民地,所以奋起抗战,誓要奋战至最后一人。

美国为什么要打越战?仅仅只是以为越南想要与俄罗斯以及亚洲的红色政权联合起来,与美国抗衡罢了。

也就是说,越南人是把这场战争放在民族独立的视角上看待的,而美国人则是吧这场战争放在冷战思维下看待的。

两国参与的其实完全不是同一场战争。

所以说 ,如果说古巴导弹危机的和平解决是因为能够通过敌人的视角看问题,那么越南战争则相反,是盲目,导致了一场完全不必要的战争。

这场纪录片,真真切切地让我感受到战争的无意义。我相信还有许多的战争,不仅是人民,甚至是两国的政府首脑也不知道为什么而打。中国面对各种国际争端,从来都是谴责。许多键盘侠认为中国没胆量。错了, 如果今天有人还敢侵略我们,中国绝对会誓死回击。可这些国际争端,能谈,难道一定要兵戎相见吗?

希望世界和平。

 2 ) The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara

The documentary <the Fog of War> directed by Errol Morris represents us 11 lessons from Robert S. McNamara who was the former president of World Band, the first Ford Motor president who was not named after Ford and then the Secretary of Defense of the United States from Kennedy Period to Johnson Period. McNamara didn’t think that he was qualified for the position the Secretary of Defense at the end of 1960 when he was in Ford Motor Company, but Kennedy insisted that his background as the commander of World War II and his Pragmatism which was based on logical analysis make him the best person for this critical position. McNamara at that time didn’t know how much he would pay for his decision in the future.
  Realist or not?
  Just by watching McNamara’s earlier life through the film and no matter what he said later as an old man who was emotionally talking about his past as the Secretary of Defense also as a husband who deeply loved his wife, he is a realist.
  During World War II, it was McNamara that recommended the air force to bomb Japanese cities by using B-29, quickly weakening Japan for just one night. He has always been in accordance with General Curtis LeMay in this point. He repeated what LeMay said after a wingman died from attacking from 5,000 feet in resolute and decisive manner, “I sent him [the wingman] there. And I've been there, I know what it is. But, you lost one wingman, and we destroyed Tokyo.” (Morris 2003) As we learn from lesson 4 which is to maximize efficiency during the war. If one want to achieve something one must sacrifice some other things. Like McNamara said that killing is sometimes saving. In China, there is a adage which is “You cannot both get fish and a bear’s paw at the same time.” That means if you want to eat fish then you cannot eat other kind of meat dish. You can only choose one you like more. That’s totally realism. According to realism, survival is one of the three main principles. McNamara had chosen to survive so he only focused on defeating Japan as soon as possible.
  And in Cuban Missile Crisis it was the same. During the phone calling part, when Kennedy asked what to do with Cuba, he immediately claimed that they should make a striking plan to get ready to invade Cuba. He thought that the Cuban nuclear weapon was a big treat to America, and for the security of his country he need to defense first.
  Even though he made a mistake, when he talked about it he seemed not felt that guilty. So we are going into the most contradictory part, and here is when McNamara began to doubt about himself. Two destroyers of the United States reported that they had been attacked. Though no one was certain about the attacker, Johnson and McNamara did believe and assume it was done by Northern Vietnam as a test of their durability, which turned out later to be a mistake. As a response, McNamara formulated the bombing program “Rolling Thunder”. Even at that time when he talked about the mistake which was the blasting fuse of Vietnam War he still didn’t think that he should be sorry for that. He said “everyone makes mistakes” with his shoulder shrugging a little bit like it was something normal. Because at that time when he decided to hit back, all in his mind was that Vietnam was attacking United States and this was a danger to his country. He only wanted to face the reality and stop this kind of invasion. All he had to do was just to fight before things getting worse. It was all originated in the same perspective just as before, so why should he be sorry for that? Until then, we still can assert that McNamara was a realist. But what makes us question about this assertion is coming.
  In USA the Vietnam War can also be named as the McNamara War. But in the film, when 85-year-old McNamara was talking to 45-year-old McNamara, it seems that he was the backbone force in restricting the Military. And he highly praised in the Cuban Missile Crisis how President Kennedy focused on the main force of their enemy, making an agreement with the Soviet Union head Khrushchev as Tommy Thompson suggested, thus avoiding a devastating nuclear war. And McNamara still believes that if Kennedy had not been assassinated in 1963, the government of United States would in most cases withdraw troops from Vietnam in 1965, there wouldn’t be a 10 year long cruel Vietnam War.
  It was like he would rather get rid of his noble position just for stopping the war. And in fact he did so. But what about the “killing for saving” before?
  “In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil. ” This was from the Responsibility Theory in 1946 for introspecting about the World War II brought out by philosopher Reinhold Neibuhr. He thought that World War II was an American war of justice, even though they all violated the principle of not hitting the civilian. And American people must learn to accept this kind of moral idea. “We have certain ideals, certain responsibilities. Recognize that at times you will have to engage in evil—but minimize it.” (Morris 2003) And with the lesson 5 “Proportionality should be a guideline in war” McNamara at last concluded that if there had to be a war, it should be a war of justice just as what he thought of LeMay’s actions toward war were.
Justice is the relevant means of organizing social relations and their conflicting claims. The demands of justice exist paradoxically within the human heart. On the one hand, justice is imperfect. If humans pursue only justice then justice will inexorably fade out of existence and self-interest would take over. (Mark 231)
Even though McNamara was looking back to history just as Neibuhr
did, but all his experience pointed to the future, just to provide something
the young generations to refer to, to path way for the nuclear war in the future.
  His educational background made him a rational analyst in data and strategy of war. His job made him a realist. Even though he admitted that the war brought too much misery for the civilians, he insisted that in a great measure it was because of the president. He said that the war was too complex for people to understand. And as for the responsibility and the guilty, he didn’t say a word. Because from the point of realism, he didn’t do anything wrong. His only fault was that he realized too late that the Vietnam War was meaningless. He resigned not because of the death number. If the Vietnam War would lead to a meaningful result, he wouldn’t resign no matter how many people would sacrifice.
  If Secretary of Defense McNamara had been informed by Neo-liberalism, would it have been an effective way to avoid the need for his “eleven lessons”? My answer would be “No.”
  Neo-liberalists believe that in order to counterbalance the fear that results from the anarchical international system, it is imperative that states peacefully coexist and create political, economic, and social ties to one another through treaties, alliances, and membership of international organizations and institutions.
  “I'm not so naive or simplistic to believe we can eliminate war,” McNamara told Morris, “We're not going to change human nature anytime soon.” But he was not at all realism, because he was not blind at all. He could see through what he was doing and at the same time analyzing if he was doing the right and useful thing. So as Kennedy thought that he was a pragmatist.
  Realism can be problematic for pragmatists where realists fear pragmatism's relativism, pragmatists fear realism's authoritarianism. This combination of realism and pragmatism basically represented the Guiding Ideology of the Kennedy Government and the Military Doctrine of the Cold War. Just as McNamara said “I was in Cold War!”
  In the book <the best and the brightest> written by David Halberstam which discussed the causes of the Vietnam War, The diplomatic of the United States Democratic Party Chester Bowles once wrote in his diary that “The new government is lack of a firm belief about what is right and what is wrong.” He thought that even though this kind of pragmatism which mostly relied on the logical analysis and mathematical operation did got the right answer in the shortest time, once the country went into the situation of specific international dispute, without taking the basic moral perspective into consideration, the pragmatism always cause the government to make wrong decisions which could not last long. Such as the Bay of Pig Events in Cuba.
  As McNamara said, one of President Kennedy’s excellences was that he could introspect the logical reasoning and withdraw troops when it was necessary.
  In the film we can see many times Domino were pushed down one by one on the map of Southeast Asia to indicate that the Kennedy Government determined to defeat the communist force of Vietnam then to pin down the whole East Asia by armed force in the early 60s. The Government took the independence of Vietnam for granted all for the leading position in Military force and thought spread strategy when facing the Communism during the Cold War. It wasn’t until that 58,000 American soldiers, causing an Anti-War wave that the Government started to think about withdrawing troops. I don’t think that the 30,000 Vietnam deaths were under the moral norms of the Government.
  When McNamara talked about the bombing in Japan when assisting the General Curtis LeMay, being asked that if they should do this to Japanese civilian, the answer was a mater-of-course. Because if they hadn’t blown the willpower of Japanese Military thoroughly, it would have been the American soldiers that dying like Japanese.
  In the book < The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara> by James G. Blight and Janet M. Langd, they provided a group of data which was in the 19th century , the rate of civilian death was 10%, in the World War II, it was 50% but 75% in 20th , called “McNamara’s Century”.
  Nevertheless, all the wars in the world, no matter it was the 911 Event or the Gulf War, they all held the flags calling for freedom, for democracy. The Fog of War that McNamara said was that the modern war is becoming more and more complicated, more and more variable, and it was almost impossible for one not to make any mistake.
  But I think there is something deeper inside. And that’s why I don’t think the influence of Neo-realism would eliminate the need for his <11 lessons> because his way to survival made him to be responsible and loyal for what he was doing which was to win the war for the competing interests, which was the Elitism covered by the Justice.
  The two most common approaches, idealism and realism, and their offspring, Neo-liberalism and Neo-realism, are illustrated by two former Harvard professors and leaders in U.S. government, Henry Kissinger and Robert McNamara. For Kissinger, it’s not so much a question of universal moral principles; it is primarily a question of taking care of America’s national interests in a world compromised by human nature’s inherent pursuit of power.
If human nature is the problem, how to deal with it is the issue. The history of humanity’s attempts to do so does not give much cause for hope. We must admit that no method of taming human nature has yet been found. Albert Einstein famously said that it is easier to denature plutonium than to change human nature.
Just as what McNamara said at the end of the film, “There is a poem from T.S Eliot that I just love, ‘We shall not cease from exploring. And at the end of the exploration, we will return to where we started. And know the place for the first time. ’And that’s the sense where I’m beginning to be.”
What did he mean by return to where we started? Human nature I think. No matter what kind of perspective we stand for. We are human beings, even animals.
From the New Testament comes a relevant question: “Do you know where your fights and arguments come from?” The answer in the Apostle James’s words: “They come from the selfish desires that war within you. You want things, but you do not have them. So you are ready to kill and are jealous of other people, but you still cannot get what you want. So you argue and fight.” (James 4:1–2, New Century Version).

 3 ) 兵部尚书麦克纳马拉的11个教训

1.了解你的敌人

2.理性救不了我们

3.天外有天,人外有人

4.最大限度的提高效率

5.相称性原则应成为战争的指导方针

6.拿到数据

7.信心和观念通常是错的

8.准备重新审视你的理由

9.为了行善,你可能不得不作恶

10.永远别说绝不

11.你无法改变人性

纪录片大致上按照时间顺序介绍了麦克纳马拉的一生,从他谈对一战的印象,到他进入哈佛,参加李梅对日本的空袭作战制定计划,担任福特汽车总裁,到担任两任总统的国防部长。在担任国防部长期间经历了古巴导弹危机,越南战争,肯尼迪遇刺等一系列事件,影片在这些事件上花费的笔墨也是最多的,11个教训也大都出自于此。

虽然纪录片的整体质量不错,能够和曾经的兵部尚书面对面的问话交谈这种形式就注定了质量不可能太差,麦克纳马拉也作了不少坦白:比如自己对他和卡斯特罗有关古巴导弹危机谈话的看法,以及对越南外交部长对越南战争的看法。但整体上,麦克纳马拉也作了很多辩解与隐藏,比如他对自己在越南战争中的一些做法是否后悔,他直接选择了避而不答,正如他在纪录片中说的那样:

“只回答你希望别人问的问题”,可以说整部纪录片中麦克纳马拉完全执行贯彻了这一点。

 4 ) 终于还是去见了他一面

2012年看的电影,距离现在已经十年了。

2011年玩COD7 Black ops的时候知道了这个人物,和老哈一起跟在他屁股后面一起去五角大楼见了JFK,当时玩的盗版游戏汉化甚至把secretary部长翻译成了秘书。

莫名其妙就记住了这个人物,一个已经作古的人物,在好奇的驱使下开始查看这个人物的真实情况,竟然十分欣赏这个人物,那个时候像入了魔一样探索起和他有关的历史,探索六十年代的美国,甚至翻遍了60-63年间的Life杂志,知道了很多他和JFK的故事。

暂且不论他的所作所为,2012年的时候还觉得他十分遥远,远到触不可及,但2017年的夏天终于还是去见了他一面,虽然是生死之隔在他的墓前,也算是给了当年无忧无虑玩着游戏的自己一个交代。

从五角大楼坐地铁到阿灵顿,那天阳光很好,但在回忆里却没有温度,草地碧绿,日暮西沉时白色和玫红的矮牵牛爬满道旁路标,一排一排的白色墓碑和在《勇闯夺命岛》片头里看到的一模一样。他的墓碑是红色的大理石,从RFK的墓地旁走几步就能到。站在eternal fire前,我看着这个被JFK称为拥有全DC最美风景的点,他当年给JFK选埋葬地点的时候,应该也站在和我同样的地方,同样看到了远处的方尖碑。

这就是了解历史后与历史重叠时最迷人的那一刻。

 5 ) Top-down examination of war from a huamnbeing‘s perspective

如果说Hearts and Minds 是bottom-up fashion ofexamining war,或者说从战争参与者的主观感受来探讨战争这一人类活动,这部片子就是top-down,自上而下的解释the complexity of war. Errol morris as a previous detective shows the power and beauty of interrogation when framing this documentary.至于影片的客观性,这种东西似乎从不存在

 6 ) 穿越战争的迷雾

美国导演埃洛·莫里斯(Errol Morris)2003年的纪录片《战争迷雾》(The Fog of War)讲述了美国肯尼迪-约翰逊政府的国防部长、福特汽车公司第一位非福特家族总裁、前世界银行行长的罗伯特·麦克纳马拉(Robert McNamara)所总结的11条战争经验教训。这11条教训中,第9条“为了行善,有时必须先行恶”很令人迷惑。

麦克纳马拉是肯尼迪-约翰逊政府中的风云人物,头脑清醒,冷静沉着,分析力过人,口才一流,被称为“长腿电脑”,与同样实用精英主义的年轻新政府完全合拍。虽然1960年底麦克纳马拉刚当上福特总裁时,并不认为自己有什么资格成为国防部长,但肯尼迪政府组阁筛选中,他的二战指挥官背景和以逻辑分析为本实用主义精神仍使他成为了国防部长的不二人选。那时风光不可一世的麦克纳马拉恐怕不会预料到自己因为走出了这历史性的一步,今后将付出什么样的惨重代价。

在美国,越战又被通称为“麦克纳马拉的战争”——这与他作为军方鹰派形象代言人指点江山帷幄千里分不开关系。但在埃洛·莫里斯的《战争迷雾》中,85岁的麦克纳马拉与45岁时的自己对话,似乎其在政府中的作用倒更是制约军方的中坚力量。比如,他高度赞扬了1962年古巴导弹事件中,肯尼迪如何力挫军方主战派,听从美国驻苏联大使勒外林·汤普森(Llewellyn Thompson)的建议与苏联元首赫鲁晓夫秘密达成协议,避免了一场毁灭性核战。麦克纳马拉相信若肯尼迪不在1963被刺杀,美国是有可能在1965年底便从越南撤军,避免之后长达十年,屠杀约三百万越南民众,5万8千多名美军士兵的残酷越战。尽管在肯尼迪遇刺,副总统约翰逊上台后,麦克纳马拉与约翰逊在美国外交政策,尤其对越南增兵一事上意见不合,并最终导致其于1968年2月的离职(或者说被辞退),他在台上之时仍继续了其鹰派代言人的职责,并在离职后对越战升级保持沉默,在轰轰烈烈的反战大潮中成为众矢之的,甚至众叛亲离。1965年一位Quaker反战组织的成员诺曼·莫里森(Norman Morrison)在麦克纳马拉的五角大楼窗下自焚,抗议越战。1972年,麦克纳马拉在前往新英格兰州好望角的玛莎酒庄的轮渡上被一位乘客认出,那人差点没把当时已56岁的老头子推下海。而麦克纳马拉唯一的儿子克雷格自学生时代便积极反战,二人关系扑朔迷离,是麦克纳马拉不愿面对镜头提起的伤心事。

在原时长近24小时的采访中,导演埃洛·莫里斯共总结出了11条防止争端升级避免核战的经验教训,如第1条,“理解你的敌人”,第5条,“成比例打击应为战争中的一条指导原则”,第8条,“准备好重新审视你的逻辑推理”等。《战争迷雾》获得了2003年的奥斯卡最佳纪录片奖,莫里斯的事件重现风格(康奈尔大学宿舍从楼梯上扔人头骨测试撞击对人的冲击力)和在讲述二战中美军对67座主要日本城市进行火弹攻击,烧死烧伤近一百万平民过程中所采取的数字符号从天而降、用美国同等地名比较日本地名,快速剪切以致二者无法分别的手法等都实至名归。但我个人对此片唯一不满的一点是他对第9条,“为了行善,有时必须先行恶”总结的重点偏移及篇幅过少缺乏深究。这一条经验教训不仅与其他的指导原则格格不入,倒更像是军方为了利益争夺战或恐怖分子为“圣战”所提出的托辞。

“为了行善,有时必须先行恶”的出处原是美国“正义战争”理论的提出者,神学家兼哲学家的雷茵霍尔德·尼布尔(Reinhold Neibuhr)在1946年反思二战的责任论。尼布尔认为二战是美国的正义之战,但因为战争双方都偏离了一战中的不打击平民的“正义”原则,美国民众便必须学会接受这种道德负担,意识到“为了行善,有时必先行恶”。

但我觉得莫里斯在总结这条经验教训时忽略了一个实施方向的问题。尼布尔当年提出的行恶以行善,是在二战结束之后回头思考,强调民众要接受一种责任感,乃至罪恶感,不要得意忘形,不应忘记战胜者给战败者的无辜平民所带来的无法弥补的伤痛。麦克纳马拉虽然也是在回顾历史,但他的所有经验教训都是指向未来的,是为了给年轻一代提供参考,在核战时代降低军事打击的可能,为和平铺路。从以史鉴今的角度来看待这11条经验教训,这第9条显然格格不入。

回到麦克纳马拉的采访本身,他在提出行善先行恶的的问题时强调的其实是对“恶”的最小化:

“为了行善,我们必须先行多少恶?我们有特定的理想,特定的责任,意识到有时你必须行恶,但(尽可能)最小化恶的程度。”

把麦克纳马拉的“恶之最小化”与其他的经验教训结合起来,尤其是第5条,“成比例打击应为战争中的一条指导原则”,这全部11条便凝结一体,共同服务于他后来致力推行的“正义战争”理论,包括对大国核弹头削减和美国参与国际战犯法庭的呼吁。

尽管如此,麦克纳马拉提出“为了行善,有时必须先行恶”并非偶然,他以此来在一定程度上为二战美军的行为和后来的越战开脱并不令人意外,因为这基本代表了肯尼迪-约翰逊政府的基本指导思想和冷战时期的美国军事指导原则。在David Halberstam探讨越战起因的《出类拔萃》(The Best and the Brightest)一书中,肯尼迪内阁的副国务卿,来自康涅狄格州的民主党外交官切斯特·鲍尔斯(Chester Bowles)曾在私人日记中担忧肯尼迪精英一派的实用主义至上原则:“新政府缺乏一种有关什么是对、什么是错的坚定信念。”他认为这种一切依赖逻辑分析加减乘除的实用主义尽管在形势宽松时间充裕的正常时期大体总能确保正确答案的推出,但一旦进入国际纠纷边防突发事件的非常时期,不以基本道德观念为基准,逻辑思维战胜一切的实用主义则往往会使一个政府缺乏远见,做出牺牲长远利益错误行动,如1961年的古巴猪猡湾事件。(1961年,肯尼迪错误的估计了古巴民众对卡斯特罗共产主义政府的支持,在CIA的支持下运送了1500名古巴流亡士兵入侵古巴猪猡湾,三天后入侵便被镇压。这不仅是肯尼迪新政府的重大军事失误,更是重大的政治失误。古巴革命政府和卡斯特罗的统治因此得到了巩固。)

在肯尼迪进行党内提名的初选时,纪录片《初选》(Primary)曾记录了他在康涅狄格州与民主党另一位候选人休伯特·汉弗莱(Hubert Humphrey)争夺提名的实况,其中他在麦迪逊城关于必须挫败越共力量获取冷战上风力量的演说,基本就是对越南的宣战。《战争迷雾》中也多次使用多米诺骨牌在东南亚地图上被推倒的片段来演示肯尼迪政府在60年代初期所坚信的必须通过武力挫败越南共产党力量,从而牵制整个东亚的必要性。《出类拔萃》一书更提到了美国对老挝和越南两种政策的对比。肯尼迪本人虽然不同意对中国的排斥封锁政策,但为了在老政府面前显示出其对红色政权的强硬形象,以及即将到来的下届总统选举,他的公开场合演说仍延续了麦卡锡主义思潮,并继续论证越战的必要性。当然,按照麦克纳马拉的说法,肯尼迪的一个过人之处是他会“重新审视逻辑推理”,所以才在形势不断恶化的情况下做出退兵的考虑。当然肯尼迪会宣布退兵的观点并不为美国左派公共知识分子诺姆·乔姆斯基(Noam Chomsky)所认同,但随着肯尼迪遇刺,这也只能成为永久的未解之谜了。

但无论如何,“为了行善,有时必须先行恶”都是实用主义思想的一个代表。肯尼迪政府为了确保美国在冷战时期面对共产主义思潮蔓延战略上和军事上的领先地位,便可以置越南的独立诉求而不顾;若不是长达十多年的越战造成了美国5万8千名士兵伤亡,在国内掀起了反战风潮,越南三百万人的冤魂恐怕才不是肯尼迪-约翰逊政府考虑其行动的道德砝码。在《战争迷雾》中麦克纳拉马谈到他协助柯蒂斯·李梅将军(Curtis LeMay)对东京进行火弹轰炸,一晚便炸死烧死十万平民,他问是否美国不应该进行如此大规模的对平民的攻击。答案是不言自明的,因为若美军不打击日本的战斗意志,不彻底摧毁后方援线,美国就必须对日本实施军事占领,对付为日本天皇誓死而战的日本军人,那到时候必须牺牲的便是美国军人。所以,所谓的“行善先行恶”之真相并无善恶,最终都是你死我忘的选择,是利益落脚点的分别,是一将功成万骨枯的丑陋现实。

在James G. Blight和Janet M. Langd的《战争迷雾:罗伯特·麦克纳马拉一生的经验教训》一书的最后一章“威尔逊的鬼魂”提供了一组令人胆颤心惊的数字:在19世纪的战争中,平民死亡率是10%;二战中是50%;而二十世纪,也就是“麦克纳马拉的世纪”,平民死亡率达到了75%!然而每一场战争,不管是恐怖分子袭击纽约世贸大楼,还是小布什政府的海湾战争,所有的发言人都打着为人民、自由、正义而战的旗号,滔滔不绝义正言辞。麦克纳马拉说所谓“战争迷雾”是指现代战争越来越复杂,变量越来越多,不犯错误简直不可能;但我认为这些战争具象迷雾的背后其实还有更深一层的迷雾,一层掩盖战争背后利益争夺真相,令统治者和当权派们一直讳莫如深的迷雾,那就是摒弃道德观的实用主义,那就是“为了行善,有时必须先行恶”鹰派思潮,那就是用“人民”和“正义”来充当势力扩张挡箭牌的精英主义,那就是用民族主义和宗教信仰来为民众洗脑的极权思想。意识不到这点,战争迷雾终将挥之不去,“威尔逊的鬼魂”死不瞑目。


罗伯特·麦克纳马拉于2009年7月6日去世,享年93岁。2009年11月的最后一天,刚获得诺贝尔和平奖不久的奥巴马总统,美国新希望的代表,在履行竞选诺言承诺从伊拉克撤兵后,宣布美国将向阿富汗增兵3万到3万5千人,但同时设定了三年的撤兵期限。在NPR对民主党和共和党议员就增兵一事的采访上,两位议员都不同程度的对三年撤兵表现出了忧虑,她们都认为美国必须在阿富汗取得胜利,因为这事关美国的“民主自由和国家安全”。

 短评

越战逐步卷入的材料在《出类拔萃之辈》里基本都看过了,没太新鲜的。麦克纳马拉85岁思维还这么清晰,表达还这么流畅,倒是很令人羡慕。果然真正的精英都是在哪都闪闪发光的。

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这片子居然在电信宽带有线点播里而且加了中文字幕。开篇即介绍了马克纳马纳最重要的政治观点:文人领军和军队政治独立。电信的节目编辑你对党指挥枪有意见请直说吗.......

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谁的冷战,谁的内战......

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不仅仅是越战

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从细节描述大事件 总是更详尽也更身临其近的

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国际政治专业必看。另外也是访谈式纪录片的典范

21分钟前
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这种衡水人,,只在乎自己曾经出现在多少rooms where it happens,,,Satan has his special project arranged for ya in the hell sweet hell 🤗

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对这个历史陈述剧里面最喜欢的一个部分其实是my middle name is Strange

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至少他是有资格上这十一堂课的.至少他是真诚的.摩尔的片在此片面前就像嗷嗷乱叫的跳梁小丑.

30分钟前
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与《杀戮演绎》《沉默之像》中的行刑者们产生了巧妙的互文。PS:原来导演是此两部电影的制片...察看导演条目才发觉,个别段落有着极相似对话发生

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I wish I had watched this one before my own documentarynproject about the Korean War. But now begin to understand more and more about Dr. Frost's comment: knowing it wouldn't have prevented anything from happening

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战争是不道德的,超越理智层面的。因此谈论它的责任归属更超越了人类的能力。这才是逻辑...

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极力推荐

39分钟前
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从福特总裁到国防部长。把一家之言拍到极致。我惊异的是:国防部长与总统之间的电话录音入档了,并且是可以公开的档案。

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麦克纳马拉担任过福特汽车总裁、美国两届总统的国防部长、世界银行总裁。他也是越战的主要决策与执行人。哈佛背景使他更善于从结果数据来分析原因与调整策略。他直言战争给平民的伤害,也承认自己的立场导致了大量平民的死亡。对此他辩解为战争太复杂人类能力局限,而对于战争的责任和罪恶感不致一词。

43分钟前
  • JuneYale
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一句话对我印象比较深:人可以用理性解决绝大多数的问题,但是人的理性是有限的。虽然没有提出怎么解决理性有限这个问题,但是我想,还是得依靠人的道德,即在理性层面之上用道德审视行为的正确性。 片中还说,人性是无法改变的,但是我想说,战争只是少数人的决定,大多数人的人性并不像总统那样,如

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麦克纳马拉风起云涌的个人史与他在任期间同样风起云涌的美国与世界史盘旋交织,前十课所学到的一切都是为了最后一课的总结:“你无法改变人性”。

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访谈类纪录片的极致,十一个章节中间有多次时间点的跳跃也完全不觉得混乱。大概内容说白了就是:“战争很复杂,很多事情我们也事先不知道啦,知道了可能就不会死这么多人啦,让对方死很多人也是为了国家啦,没犯法的打仗时候哪有法律说不行,我是听总统的话办事啦。越战责任?总统的咯!”—甩锅侠

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一切都不是那么的简单如历史里头所述

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秒杀其他所有关于战争的纪录片

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